By Iakovos Vasiliou
This leading edge learn of Plato's ethics makes a speciality of the idea that of advantage. in response to precise readings of the main in demand Platonic dialogues on advantage, it argues that there's a principal but formerly not noted conceptual contrast in Plato among the belief of advantage because the splendid objective of one's activities and the choice of which action-tokens or -types are virtuous. Appreciating the 'aiming/determining distinction' presents specified and collectively constant readings of the main famous Platonic dialogues on advantage in addition to unique interpretations of important Platonic questions. in contrast to so much examinations of Plato's ethics, this research doesn't take as its centrepiece the 'eudaimonist framework', which focusses at the courting among advantage and happiness. as an alternative Aiming at advantage in Plato argues that the dialogues themselves commence with the assumption of the supremacy of advantage, learn how that declare will be defended, and tackle the way to be certain what constitutes the virtuous motion.
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Additional info for Aiming at Virtue in Plato
10 One more passage: To do wrong [dike±n] and to disobey one’s better [belt©oni], whether man or god, this I know [o²da] is bad and disgraceful [kak¼n kaª a«scr»n]. (29b6–7) This statement emphasizes SV’s role as a limiting condition. 11 This formulation of SV, which is so central to the Crito (cf. 49a–e), expresses its ubiquitous role as a limiting condition. ) and his refusal during the rule of the Thirty to bring in Leon of Salamis (32c). It is again no part of Socrates’ argument here that what he did was right; a particular Athenian might take issue with that, and it would need to be argued about separately.
For unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, X’s [the person’s] commander must be presumed to be in a better position to know what it is best for him to do on the battleﬁeld or its analogue, the Athenian polis, than X is himself. But . . the only contrary evidence X has is that staying at his post puts him at risk of dying. And that . . has insufﬁcient weight to justify disobedience. ” (112). But when Reeve says that “unless there is strong evidence to the contrary, X’s commander must be presumed to be in a better position” he almost begs the question: if the commander is in a better position to see what virtue truly requires, then he is morally superior at least in that context.
I shall reiterate that what Socrates knows is wrong is to do unjust actions. In this passage he is taking that description for granted. By contrast he never claims to know that certain types of actions (described in non-evaluative terms) or certain token actions are or are not unjust (barring, as always, the intervention of his divine sign). Socrates displays similar reasoning during the penalty phase of the trial, while he is deliberating about what penalty he should assess for himself. Given that he has been found guilty and that his accusers have proposed death, an ordinary person in such a situation would propose a penalty severe enough that the jury might accept it in lieu of death.
Aiming at Virtue in Plato by Iakovos Vasiliou